Introduction
Forestland fragmentation is a process related to geography, population, family tradition and regulation changes. Landscape is complex in China, which provides advantageous condition for diversified forestland operation and at the same time, causes the fragmentation of natural forestland.
From the historical point of view, China's population increased dramatically since Song Dynasty and land supply could not follow the speed of population boom. This is one reason for the increased forestland fragmentation. From the viewpoint of family tradition, forestland fragmentation increased due to the traditional heritage system because land must be divided for different children. From the viewpoint of forest right mechanism changes, forestland is further fragmentized due to the policy in 1980s and the collective forest right applied in 2003. In order to overcome the economic problem resulted from the small-scale business, government raised a series of policies in 2008. Debates never stop among scholars since some argue that forestland fragmentation would not enhance the operating efficiency while others argue that fragmentation of forestland is just one part of Chinese tradition because this is fair as every farmer has his own land. From the empirical side, fragmentation of forestland is not changed significantly although current collective forest reform policy releases the right of trade to farmers. So far, the studies about the large scale evaluation of forest fragmentation, farmers' contributions and Abstract. The purpose of this study is to quantify the relationship between fragmentized collective forestland, farmers investment and forest commodity output to examine the rationality of collective forest right reform after dispersed forestland operation. The data is based on the 2420 farmers' survey data in nine provinces of China including Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, Sichuan, Zhejiang, Guangxi, Henan, Shandong and Liaoning. The results show that if S index is used, fragmentized forestland reaches 0.41 and can be ordered (from high to low) as Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Hunan, Liaoning, Sichuan, Fujian, Guangxi and Shandong. Under certain fragmentized intervals (forestland fragmentized ratio lower than 0.22 or higher than 0.51), the higher the forestland fragmentized, the lower the farmers investment. The investment-output model indicates that forest block reflects the negative impacts to forest output while other variables such as labor, tangible inputs and forestland have positive impacts. When bamboo is produced, level of fragmentation has negative impacts on forestland acreage and significant positive impacts on labor used. The study implies that after the land is divided to households, physical investment is the key factor to affect the commodity output and should be considered by the related policies to increase the incentives of farmers. Based on this study, we provide some information and guidance on policy of farmers' forestland operation in large scale.
forest commodity outputs under such policies are insufficient. The study uses 2420 household survey data in 18 counties among Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, Sichuan, Zhejiang, Guangxi, Henan, Shandong and Liaoning provinces to answer the relationship between fragmentized collective forestland, farmers investment and forest commodity output and examine the rationality of the collective forest right reform after dispersed forestland operation.
Three fundamental stages of forest fragmentation process
In China, forest fragmentation and forest fragmentation reform starts simultaneously while the former occurs mainly in the southern collective forest. The fragmentation process can be divided into three stages. The first stage happened in 1980s with a central official document announcing that forest right should be stabilized, retained mountain should be claimed and forest production responsibility should be determined, which also accelerates the speed of forest fragmentation process. Statistics from the Department of Forest indicates that until 1984, 90% forestland owners among these 9 provinces held 0.43 hm 2 on average with 0.04 hm 2 per capita.
Combination of forest, specialized farmers, and forest union increased to more than 400 households (Lu, 2002 , about 75% of total verified forests (Jia, 2009 ). The reform of forest right improves the diversification of ownership-operation and speeds the process of forest fragmentation (Kong, 2008 ).
Problems facing forest managers after forestland fragmentation
Focusing on the negative impacts brought from the forest fragmentation, many scholars criticize this situation and small scale operation from the viewpoint of scaling operation. For example, some scholars (Song et al., 1997) suggest that household corporation system in China's collective forest operation may help benefit distribution. Li (2001) suggests that to improve the disadvantageous situation of forestry, combination forest rights might be a feasible possibility. Wang (2009) 
Definition of forestland fragmentation
Concept of land fragmentation is widely used in China. Forest fragmentation is raised based on land fragmentation but without an exact definition. Therefore, this study infers the more mature definition on cropland fragmentation to define the forest fragmentation. Forest fragmentation has two necessary conditions including more than two separate forests and these forests should be small. Based on these conditions, forest fragmentation means a farmer must operate more than one small forests that are not adjacent. In this study, we focus on the economic analysis of the adjacent forests although possibility of transferring nonadjacent forests to adjacent and larger forests does exist. We also emphasize the economic intuition on the small blocks and scale economy, which is to enhance the return from the resource, increase income and reduce costs (Zhang and Huang, 1997; Cheng, 2001 ).
Based on this definition, forest fragmentation considers more on the economic side and thus should have the following two characteristics: (1) block is too small to realize the scale economy and (2) blocks can be combined through sales.
The measurement of forest fragmentation
There are two major methods for the measurement of forest fragmentation. One is to use single index to measure the level of fragmentation based on the number and area of blocks (Binns, 1950 ) and the other is to build a relatively complicate index. King and Burton (1982) constructed S indexes, J index and I index based on six factors including farm size, block number, block size, block shape, spatial and grain distribution of blocks.
These indexes are expressed as follow:
where n is the block number owned by the farmer, α is the size of the block and W is the distance between blocks.
The values of S and J are between 0 and 1.
When S is closer to 1, then the level of forest fragmentation is higher while J index has 
Quantitative analysis of the level of forest fragmentation

Statistic description before and after
forest right reform Table 1 shows the number and changes of farmer forestland block before and after the forest right reform. Average farmer owned block increases 0.92, which is 16.12% higher than the reform has been applied. Among the research area, the number of owned blocks in Guangxi and Liaoning provinces increases the most while that in Hunan increases the least.
From Table 1 we also see that the problem of forest fragmentation did exist and the forest rights reform is to make this problem even serious.
Analysis of the level of forest fragmentation based on 2420 farmer households
From the survey data, we see that 36.47% of farmers operate 1-2 forests, 27.98% of farmers operate 3-4 forests, 16.87% of farmers operate 5-6 forests, 13.01% of farmers operate 7-10 forests and 5.66% of farmers operate more than 10 forests (Table 2 ). On average, each farmer operates 4.52 forests. Based on the statistic result, we see Jiangxi, Zhejiang and Sichuan have the highest farmer owned forests while Shandong has the lowest. The difference is mainly due to the landscape and time of forest rights reform. Generally speaking, the distance between block and road should affect the efficiency of production because the longer the distance, the more time is needed to transport commodities. The longest distance in our samples is 16 km and 5.61% of block is longer than 5 km while 9.22% is shorter than 0.1 km. Distance between block and road is less than 0.5 km.
The comprehensive S-index describes the level of forest fragmentation even straight. In this study, the number and size of blocks and the distance between block to road increase the measurement of S index. 
Relationship between the level of forest fragmentation and investment-income ratio
In order to analyze the impact between the level of forest fragmentation and investmentincome ratio, we use the same independent variable and use the investment-income ratio (YI) as dependent variable to construct a single variate regression model. The model can be expressed as: From equation (5) we see the R 2 is 0.821 and thus the model has high explanatory power. The P value of constant and independent variable is less than 0.01 and this means when others held constant, independent variable X does have significant impact between the level of forest fragmentation and farmers' investment-income ratio. Getting extreme value from this equation, when the level of forest fragmentation is between 0.17 to 0.52, higher level of forest fragmentation exists and when X falls outside this range, the level of forest fragmentation is smaller and suitable for household investment.
Impacts of forest fragmentation and farmers' investment on forestry production 2.5.1 Selection of model variables
This study utilizes the Cobb-Douglas production function to examine the relationship between forest fragmentation and forestry production. Because the study focuses on the impact of forest fragmentation and farmers' investment on forestry production, number of forest block is independent variable and unit forestry production is dependent variable. The Production function means that under certain technological level, a fixed amount of investment relies on the production possibilities. Investment includes labor, capital and land. In this study, independent variables are determined and explained as follow: (1 
Model construction
The Cobb-Douglas production function can be expressed as
where Y is production and X i stands for
The number of forest block operated expresses change of forest fragmentation and thus it can not be used as one input variable. Based on the theories of developing economics and past experience, scaling operation is firstly impacted by the forest fragmentation. Because β i (i = 1 ,2 ... k) is elasticity, we construct a model that links this to that forest fragmentation:
P in equation (7) stands for the number of forest block and plugs into the Cobb-Douglas production function, we can get:
. (8) Put natural log both sides, we get model II and it is expressed as 
Therefore, we can get model III:
The coefficient corresponding to scale economy is defined by ∑ + LnP 
Result of model estimation (1) Variable description
Survey data used in this empirical study collected from farmers among nine provinces in 2009. Forestry commodities include wood, bamboo, bamboo shoots, economic forest product 1, economic forest product 2, economic forest product 3, fuel wood and nonwood forest products. Output is calculated on a household basis and plant area is in hectares, physical investment is in dollars and labor is determined by working days. From the data .
, where
. (11) obtained, the major products are wood and bamboo while others are in a relatively small number. , likelihood value is higher in economic forest products and others are low (see Table 9 ).
(3) Model selection
From Table 10 we can see that when wood is output, only LDXSCD has negative impacts within four independent variables, which is the same as our expectation. Other variables such as labor, land and capital have positive impacts on forestry o u t p u t s . T va l u e o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g γ of physical investment is greater than 2, which indicates that the positive impact of physical investment is significant. However, the γ of forest fragmentation shows the negative impact of forest fragmentation is significant. The estimated result of bamboo is different from our expectation where the LDXSCD does not have negative impacts on forestry production while the LDMJ has the negative impacts and labor has positive impacts. From the coefficient of forest area, we see that the negative impact of bamboo area is significant. 
Conclusion and discussion
The collective forest rights reform is the basis of China's forest fragmentation.
Because of natural geographic and resource differences, effects of forest fragmentation become even stronger. The latest forest reform also increases the level of fragmentation. Survey data shows that the total block number has increased by 16.12% with the highest increase in Guangxi and Liaoning and smallest increase in Hunan.
The result also shows that even forest rights have been determined; the number of forest block does not increase per household. This tells that the latest forest rights reform only has limited impact on forest fragmentation. Compared the data, we find that mountainous area has more significant impacts on forest fragmentation than the plain area, but the impacts are limited by the spatial constraint and time lags. Statistics of number and size of block and average area of forest show that China's forest fragmentation is not very high.
Therefore, the living standard and household forest fragmentation does not increase in the same speed. Rather, dividing forest to household increases the size of forests owned by farmers, which push the scale forest operation. In general, scale effects mean lower production cost or higher production when operating expands. For this reason, we should not encourage land monopoly. The quantitative analysis indicates that under certain S index intervals, the higher then level of forest fragmentation, the more difficult for farmers to invest. But when the level of forest fragmentation is lower than 0.22 or higher than 0.51, it would help investment. The same logic applies for the investmentincome ratio. This says that the level of forest fragmentation and investment do not have negative linear correlation and the development of scale operation and investment do not have positive linear correlation, which is the same as the field survey. The main reasons for low investment include lack of capital and labor low profits from forestry. Lacking of labor is due to the large-scale operation and high salaries. This indicates that under current operating condition, appropriate labor supply and external capital support must be an important policy suggestions to keep scale forest operation.
Fragmentized forest operation has negative impacts to forest wood production but no significant impact on bamboo. For bamboo, investment level is the most important factor to its output and when the capital is not sufficient, the larger the size of bamboo forest, the unit output is lower due to decrease on average investment. Therefore, labor, physical and ground investment have positive impacts on wood and bamboo products where the physical investment has the largest effect. This also means that after the land is divided to households, physical investment is the key factor to affect the commodity output and should be considered by the related policies to increase the incentives of farmers.
